For almost two years the British Government has refused to confirm or deny that it secretly ordered Apple to keep a way into its customers’ encrypted iCloud data. That position has now collapsed. In a judgment handed down on 19 November (UK time), the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the specialist court that hears complaints about UK surveillance, ruled that the Home Secretary can no longer hide the fact that she gave Apple a “technical capability notice”. What the notice actually demands is still secret.
What the tribunal decided
A technical capability notice is an order under section 253 of the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act 2016. As law news site ICLG explains, it can require a company to put systems in place so it can comply with future warrants, including keeping the ability to remove encryption it applies to customers’ data. Police and spy agencies still need separate legal authority to read any particular person’s data.
The Home Office had argued that even confirming the notice existed would damage national security. The three judges, Lady Carmichael, Mr Justice Chamberlain and Mr Justice Johnson, disagreed. The key line in their ruling reads: “We reject the respondent’s contention that it would be damaging to national security to confirm the fact that the respondent has given Apple a technical capability notice.”
Much of the reasoning concerns the government’s own behaviour. The judges noted that The Times and the Financial Times had reported government officials confirming the notice, and that the Home Office filed no detailed evidence to show those briefings weren’t authorised. They concluded: “we infer that the briefings that are reported by The Times and The Financial Times did take place, and that they were authorised by Government Ministers or senior department officials or special advisers.” They also pointed to public comments from US officials, including a post on X in August 2025 by Tulsi Gabbard, then US Director of National Intelligence, saying “the UK has agreed to drop its mandate for Apple to provide a “back door” that would have enabled access to the protected encrypted data of American citizens”.
What is still secret
The ruling does not reveal what the notice requires. The tribunal said the question of whether any details can be disclosed “is better addressed separately, after disclosure of evidence and when the precise issues to be determined at the hearing are clear.” It also handed down separate PRIVATE and CLOSED judgments that cannot be published.
According to the judgment, Apple’s first challenge was dismissed “because of a change of circumstances”, and Apple started a second claim in July 2026. A separate challenge to the notice regime has been brought by Privacy International, Liberty and two individuals. The parties expect a full hearing in the first half of 2027. The tribunal didn’t say what the change of circumstances was. The judgment does record that the Financial Times reported in October 2025 that the UK had issued a new order in September 2025, after the US said London had backed down.
In a statement reported by The Register, a UK government spokesperson defended the powers and said Apple has been helping police and intelligence agencies “for several years”, adding: “This Technical Capability Notice simply requires that they maintain the ability to do so.” Apple had not responded to The Register’s request for comment. Privacy International, one of the claimants, called the ruling “a major victory for transparency and effective oversight.”
What it means for iPhone users
The most visible result of the dispute so far is in the UK. Apple says it can no longer offer Advanced Data Protection (ADP) to new users there. ADP is the optional iCloud setting that adds end-to-end encryption to things like iCloud Backup, Photos and Notes. On that page Apple also says “we have never built a backdoor or master key to any of our products or services and we never will.”
Apple’s page also says: “Advanced Data Protection continues to be available everywhere else in the world.” That includes Australia. Apple’s iCloud security overview says 15 data categories, including passwords in iCloud Keychain and Health data, are end-to-end encrypted by default. Turning on ADP raises that to 25. Without it, Apple holds the keys for things like your iCloud backups and photos, which means it can recover them for you, and can also hand them over in response to a valid legal demand.
If you want ADP, Apple’s set-up guide says you need two-factor authentication, a device passcode and up-to-date software on every device signed in to your account (iOS 16.2 or later on iPhone, macOS 13.1 or later on Mac). You also need to set up a recovery contact or a recovery key first. That last part matters: with ADP on, Apple can’t help you get your data back if you lose access to your account.
The Australian angle: we have our own version
Australia has its own “technical capability notice”. It was created by the Assistance and Access Act 2018, the encryption law passed in Canberra in 2018. According to Home Affairs, “Technical capability notices may only be issued by the Attorney-General”, and the Communications Minister must also approve them.
The Australian law has a limit written into it. Home Affairs says that “nothing in this legislation can require industry to break encryption”, and that the government cannot “build or implement so-called ‘backdoors’ or do anything that would make the communications of innocent persons less secure”. That is the government’s own description of its law. Home Affairs says the Act is subject to ongoing review by Parliament’s Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. The UK case is a reminder that these notices can be issued, and fought over, largely out of public view.
We’ve also looked at another recent Apple privacy question: its plan to check public iCloud links for “harmful content”.
What to watch
- How the Home Office responds, and whether it now formally confirms the notice in the proceedings.
- How much of the notice is made public before or at the 2027 hearing. The tribunal has left that open.
- Whether ADP returns to the UK. Apple says it hopes to offer it there again in future.
- Any sign of similar demands elsewhere, including how Australia’s own notice powers are used. Home Affairs says the Act’s use is reported to Parliament each year.
Our view: the ruling is about secrecy, not about whether the UK can make Apple weaken its encryption. That bigger question is still to come. But it matters that a court has refused to let the government keep an order this big secret after its own officials had briefed journalists about it. For Australians, the practical point is simple: ADP is available here, and if you rely on iCloud backups, it’s worth deciding on purpose whether to turn it on.
Featured image: the Home Office building at 2 Marsham Street, Westminster, London, photographed in 2010. Photo: Steph Gray via Wikimedia Commons, licensed CC BY-SA 2.0 (cropped and resized).




